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INTRODUCTION
putting some of the points decided into sharp focus. One of the two objectives of this piece is to draw the reader's attention to three aspects of the decision in Buckland which are particularly deserving of comment. The second is to consider the implications of two of those three factors for our understanding of the likely evolution of the content of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence and the law of statutory constructive dismissal.
THE FACTS AND THE MATTERS DECIDED IN BUCKLAND
Buckland concerned a dispute between a professor of environmental archaeology and his employer, the University of Bournemouth, over the unauthorised re-marking of exam scripts. Two colleagues of the professor had re-marked the scripts which he had failed and altered the gradings which had been awarded. The general trend was to alter the marks in an upwards direction so that some of the students who had failed were subsequently passed. Moreover, Professor Buckland's marking practice was also criticised. After an independent internal review produced a report which exonerated the professor, he resigned and claimed that he had been constructively dismissed in terms of section 95(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act (ERA) and that his dismissal was unfair contrary to section 98(4) of the ERA. Section 95(1)(c) of the ERA provides as follows:
an employee is dismissed by his employer if … the employee terminates the contract under which he is employed (with or without notice) in circumstances in which he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer's conduct.
Pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp, 5 if an employee is able to show that the employer's conduct amounted to a repudiatory breach going to the root of the contract of employment, this will be sufficient for the employee to establish constructive dismissal under section 95(1)(c) of the ERA. Subsequent to the decision in Western Excavating, it was held that a fundamental breach of an express term, or a common law implied term, of the contract of employment by the employer would be considered sufficiently serious to entitle the employee to a finding of constructive dismissal. 6 Since the authorities dictate that a breach of the common law implied term of trust and confidence is automatically repudiatory, 7 the effect is that such a breach will amount to a statutory constructive dismissal. 8 The next stage for the employee is to satisfy a tribunal or court that the constructive dismissal was unfair under section 98(4) of the ERA. As a means of evaluating the fairness of an employee's dismissal under section 98(4) of the ERA, case law dictates that an adjudicator should ask whether the substance of the employer's decision to dismiss and the procedure it adopted prior to dismissal, fell within the range of reasonable responses open to reasonable employers.
The professor sought to show that he had been constructively dismissed on the basis of a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence. The Court of Appeal ruled that the employer's actions rendered it in repudiatory breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence and that the professor had been constructively dismissed. The employer's report which cleared the professor of incompetence did not operate to rectify the employer's repudiatory breach of the contract of employment. It was also held that the professor's dismissal was unfair and so he was entitled to be paid compensation under section 123 of the ERA.
THREE POINTS TO NOTE
Three points emerge from the decision in Buckland. First, it was held that whether an employee has been constructively dismissed in terms of section 95(1)(c) of the ERA is to be determined by a court or tribunal in accordance with the traditional approach enunciated in Western Excavating. [a]lthough the Malik term is not equivalent to a term simply that the employer will behave reasonably, nevertheless in deciding whether it has been breached it will generally be relevant to consider whether the conduct complained of was reasonable: if it was, the employer will generally have 'reasonable and proper cause' for it, and, if it was not, that fact is likely to be at least material to the question of whether it was such as to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence between employer and employee. 22 The notion that a more elastic, as opposed to mechanical approach, should be applied towards limbs (i) and (ii) above accords with Brodie's conceptualisation of both strands as functioning on two different, yet mutually connected levels, in the sense that (i) is concerned with substantive fairness, whereas the reasonable and proper cause strand (ii) acts as a plank on which the procedural fairness of the process leading up to the employer's trust-destroying conduct (ie the constructive dismissal in a section 95(1)(c) ERA claim in the employment tribunal) can be assessed. 23 Finally, in Buckland it was held that as far as English law is concerned, it is impossible for a party in repudiatory breach of the contract of employment to cure or rectify that breach by his/her unilateral actions. 24 The Court of Appeal was not prepared to disturb general contractual principles of English law. Therefore, if the conduct of an employer destroys or severely undermines mutual trust and confidence and there is no reasonable and proper cause for that conduct, a repudiatory breach of contract arises which is incapable of being expunged at the behest of the employer alone. Instead, the employee has an option and it is over to him/her to accept the repudiation, terminate the contract and claim constructive dismissal under section 95(1)(c) of the ERA or to affirm the contract, whereupon the contract of employment continues. For example, in Buckland, where the professional integrity of the professor had been undermined by colleagues who had arranged for exam papers which he had corrected to be re-marked without authorisation from the board of examiners, there was no scope for the employer to ascribe legal significance to a subsequent internal report which vindicated the employee's original marking. The subsequent internal report did not function to cure the repudiatory breach which had been constituted by the undermining of the employee. However, the Court of Appeal did indicate that the employer's subsequent conduct may serve to invite the employee to affirm the contract. In such circumstances, the signal was despatched to employment tribunals that they would have the power to 'take a reasonably robust approach to affirmation' in the sense that the employee will have a limited period of time to accept the repudiatory breach, after which the employee will be presumed to have affirmed.
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL AFTER BUCKLAND
Inherent in the statutory concept of constructive dismissal lies a tension which is captured in terms of
Beatson's reference to the 'oil and water' relationship between statute and the common law. 26 This is the notion which represents the traditional orthodoxy espoused by English law 27 that the common law and statutes (such as the ERA) constitute two independent layers of regulation, and that the predicates on which each are legitimized are divergent and wholly unrelated. The two shall not mix and crossfertilization is rejected, since legal evolution by analogy with the other may lead to crosscontamination. When examined in light of this conceptual debate and other key decisions of the courts and the EAT, the decision in Buckland has implications for the approach which employers should tactically adopt towards the defence of a statutory constructive dismissal claim. Indeed, those implications owe at least some of their existence to the somewhat beguiling interplay between the common law and statute, bearing in mind that in fleshing out the meaning of the statutory concept of constructive dismissal, contrary to the orthodoxy described above, the judiciary have specifically opted to harness common law concepts in aid of interpretation. 28 Furthermore, a 'feedback' dynamic has been generated in terms of which the content of the common law has developed by analogy with statutory employment rights. 29 With this general point in mind, it is submitted that post-Buckland an employer has two defences to a claim that its conduct amounted to a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence (1) amounting to a statutory constructive dismissal under the ERA or (2) conferring a right to damages in favour of the employee in the common law courts. First, the employer may defend the claim by demonstrating that it had reasonable and proper cause for acting, or omitting to act, in a way which functioned to destroy or severely undermine trust and confidence in the employment However, the approach in Aberdeen City Council would appear to be misconceived, since it is by no means correct to say that Scots law directs that a party in anterior material breach is disentitled from exercising his/her rights under a contract where the counterparty is also in material/repudiatory breach (eg by electing to sue for damages for breach or by electing to accept the repudiation and rescind/terminate the contract). Indeed, the Scots authorities cited for such a proposition are arguably no longer good law 32 The decision in Buckland also has implications for the maintenance of the employer's reasonable and proper cause defence to a claim that its conduct undermines trust and confidence. As an instruction to take garden leave would be that there had been a repudiatory breach and the employee would be taken to have been statutorily constructively dismissed or would be entitled to damages in a common law court. Therefore, in order to ensure the reasonable and proper cause defence no longer presents a challenge for the law of statutory constructive dismissal, rather than remove it outright, an alternative way of proceeding would be to limit its preservation to the situation where it is invoked by an employee as a means of claiming relief in the common law courts.
However, if the defence was removed in the context of statutory constructive dismissal, but retained in the case of a common law claim, the danger is that the law would be open to the charge that it was intrinsically disjointed since the content of the implied term would vary, depending on the forum in which it was advanced as the basis for a claim, leading to a 'dual nature' implied term. It is submitted that the degree of doctrinal confusion generated by a dual nature implied term would be far greater and more insidious than the current difficulties caused by the existence of the reasonable and proper cause defence for the law of statutory constructive dismissal articulated above. This discourse feeds into the 'oil and water' debate about the relationship between the common law and statute, ie whether it would be conceptually coherent for section 95(1)(c) of the ERA specifically to adapt itself to such an extent that it travels in another direction from the original common law source. 50 Therefore, on balance, despite initial misgivings, the writer is of the view that there are compelling arguments in favour of the preservation of the reasonable and proper cause limb (ii) of the implied term from a doctrinal perspective. The end result is the current legal position, ie that limbs (i) and (ii) are assessed by a court and tribunal on the basis of an objective standard of review under section 95(1)(c) of the ERA for the purposes of a common law claim in the courts, whereas the overall fairness of the trustdestroying conduct in repudiatory breach of the contract of employment is approached from the perspective of the range of reasonable responses standard of review for the purposes of section 98 (4) of the ERA.
THE OPPORTUNITY TO CURE A REPUDIATORY BREACH OF CONTRACT
In Buckland, Sedley LJ made it abundantly clear that it was impossible under English law for a wrongdoer to take unilateral action to rectify a repudiatory breach of contract. Since a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence is treated as automatically repudiatory, 51 it stands to reason that an employer has no power to rectify trust-destroying conduct. However, one should perhaps stand back and enquire whether this rule of law is doctrinally or logically sound, bearing in mind that it was recognised by Sedley LJ in Buckland that English law recognises the ability of a wrongdoer to cure an anticipatory breach of contract. The Court of Appeal in Buckland felt constrained by well-established principles of English contract law and was not prepared to alter the common law of the contract of employment and release the contents of a 'Pandora's Box' since it would have repercussions for the general law of contract. This is another example of the tendency of the judiciary to rely on common law concepts in order to infuse meaning into constructive dismissal.
It also links in with the notion that the contract of employment is relational in nature 52 involving future co-operation and ongoing personal social exchange amongst the parties over a long-term period. 53 The 'relational-ness' of the employment contract finds its expression in the implied term of mutual trust and confidence which amounts to the principal relational norm inherent within the employment relationship. 54 The normative expectations which can be derived from the implied term are aspects which the employee expects to adhere to and are also such that they anticipate adherence from the employer (and vice versa). Thus, if such a normative proposition which is so central to the employment relationship is breached, social solidarity and trust between the contracting parties is severed and the innocent party should no longer be expected to continue with the relationship should it so wish, irrespective of any atonement on the part of the wrongdoer. 55 It is implicit in the notion of an 'opportunity to rectify' that the innocent party should be deprived of that right to withdraw. This would result in the continuation of the employment relationship against the will of the employee and it is this idea which is so incompatible with the relational nature of the employment contract, ie that once an employer has breached the trust and confidence implied term, a repudiatory breach and constructive dismissal has occurred enabling the employee to be discharged from any further performance, since the employer has evinced an intention no longer to be bound by the contract. It is also at odds with the elective theory of termination of the contract of employment, ie that a repudiatory breach of the contract does not automatically bring it to an end. 56 However, in Scots law, there is the possibility that the legal position may well differ from English law as there is some authority to suggest that a party in breach of contract ought to be allowed to cure, thus limiting the scope for the innocent party to terminate the contract. 57 However, other commentators have submitted that it is not entirely clear that this is the 'true' Scots law position and rather it is better to conceptualise the ability of the wrongdoer to cure as an indicator by the law that the breach in question is not material, ie that it is not repudiatory. 58 Such an argument posits that implicit within a finding that a wrongdoer has a right to cure a breach of contract is the recognition that there has been no repudiatory breach. The debate surrounding the true nature of the Scots law rule has implications for the proposition of law expressed above that a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence is automatically repudiatory. If a future Scots court or tribunal were to hold that an employer was entitled to cure or rectify a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, this would mean that it was not automatically repudiatory and a clear divergence of approach between Scots law and English law would have been opened up. However, reverting to the idea that the employment relationship is predicated on a relational contract of employment, and the normative propositions which formulate its content and scope of application are relational in nature, such as the implied term of mutual trust, it is submitted that the Scots courts would have taken a wrong turn were they to adopt such a position. For that reason, analysed from the perspective of relational contract theory, it is doubtful whether it would be conceptually desirable for a Scots court to afford an employer the right to cure in such circumstances.
A number of commentators have questioned the coherence of the rule that a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence should be treated as automatically repudiatory. 59 On one view, it might be considered as stretching logic to contend that actions or omissions which are so extreme that they destroy trust and confidence are of insufficient quality of themselves to amount to a repudiatory breach. The terminology of 'destruction' and 'severe undermining' of trust and confidence is sufficiently emphatic to infer repudiation on the occurrence of a breach. On the other hand, there is considerable force in the contention that treating the implied term of mutual trust and confidence in this way sets it apart 60 from other implied terms of the contract of employment which do usually require something else to be established in order to amount to a repudiatory breach. For example, in the context of the implied term of the contract of employment which enjoins the employer to exercise reasonable care for the well-being of its employees, there is scope for an employer in breach to argue that its actions were insufficient to constitute a repudiatory breach of contract. 61 The employer's point here would be that no repudiatory breach had been established as it had good cause for acting in the way it did or that its conduct was not sufficiently wrongful. Indeed, it is suggested that the absence of any presumption that a breach of another implied term is automatically repudiatory operates as the functional equivalent of the reasonable and proper cause defence at limb (ii) above where it is alleged that there has been a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence. This is another reason for maintaining the reasonable and proper cause defence as an inherent part of the lexicon of the implied term. Furthermore, bearing in mind the relational philosophy intrinsic to the employment relationship, this provides further support for the view that the Court of Appeal was right to reject the notion that a wrongdoer should have the right to cure.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL AFTER BUCKLAND
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Buckland reinforces the relational nature of the contract of employment by depriving an employer of the scope to make amends where it is in repudiatory breach.
Buckland is also compatible with the notion that the elective theory of termination is applicable in the case of the common law of the contract of employment. The key role of objectivity in ascertaining whether there has been a constructive dismissal was restated, implicitly drawing a distinction between the standard of scrutiny of the managerial prerogative associated with it and the range of reasonable responses test. Finally, Buckland clarifies that an employer has a number of defences where an employee claims that he/she has been unfairly constructively dismissed.
